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Abstract
Despite the unconditionally secure theory of quantum key distribution (QKD), several
attacks have been successfully implemented against commercial QKD systems. Those
systems have exhibited some flaws, as the secret key rate of corresponding protocols
remains unaltered, while the eavesdropper obtains the entire secret key. We propose a
new theoretical approach called quantum flows to be able to detect the eavesdropping
activity in the channel without requiring additional optical components different from the
BB84 protocol because the system can be implemented as a high software module. In this
approach, the transmitter interleaves pairs of quantum states, referred to here as parallel
and orthogonal (non-orthogonal) states, while the receiver uses active basis selection.
Keywords: quantum key distribution, photon number splitting attack, intercept resend
faked states attack
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique to distribute securely a cryptographic key
between two remote users, usually called Alice and Bob. The first QKDmethod was conceived
by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984, usually referred to in literature as BB84 [1].
Figure 1 shows a simplified representation of the two-dimensional Bloch sphere, the quantum
states, and the measurement bases of BB84.
QKD systems are designed to serve the purpose of generating secret bits, usable to encrypt
plain-text messages based on a simple X – Or logical function between the message and a
secret key. The use of this system provides the availability to detect any eavesdropper, com-
monly called Eve, trying to intercept the quantum channel to get the key. In this case, the
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whole process will be discarded before a key can be established [2]. On the other hand, if no
eavesdropping activity is detected, the quantum measurements are used to derive the secret
key. When the transmission is finished, Alice and Bob compare a fraction of the exchanged key
in order to detect any transmission errors caused by eavesdropping. Experimentally, QKD
systems have been proved using dedicated optical fibers, across free space, weak laser pulses
or single photons, entangled photon pairs, or continuous variables [3].
We propose a new approach for QKD protocols called quantum flows where the transmitter
interleaves pairs of quantum states, referred to here as parallel and orthogonal (non-orthogonal)
states, while the receiver applies active basis selection to perform state measurement. In a
study by Lizama et al. [4], a brand new QKD protocol, called ack-state and referred to also as
ack-QKD, is introduced. This protocol uses weak coherent states and active basis measurement
and has the capability to detect photon number splitting (PNS) eavesdropping activity, and its
strengths against the PNS attack are discussed by Lizama-Pérez et al. [5]. The ack-state protocol
was extended by Lizama-Pérez et al. [6] to the dual protocol known as nack state protocol in
order to have an analysis of its security when facing an intercept and resend with faked states
(IRFS) attack.
One of the main advantages of these protocols is that they protect against the PNS and the
IRFS attacks without requiring any changes in the hardware; only software changes are
required.
2. Quantum hacking in QKD systems
In ideal conditions, QKD protocols’ security is based on the attributes of quantum mechanics,
as it makes eavesdropping activities detectable in the middle of the quantum channel [1, 7].
But the technological implementation brings serious concerns as most of the QKD systems
have vulnerabilities to quantum hacking due to loopholes in the optical detection system [8–18].
Given this condition, it is necessary to develop newQKD protocols that are able to resist different
attacks due to such vulnerabilities as the photon number splitting (PNS) and the intercept and
resend with faked states (IRFS) attacks [19, 20].
Figure 1. The BB84 qubits are the non-orthogonal states: the measurement bases, Z and X, are shown as vertical and
horizontal lines, correspondingly. When basis X (Z) is used by Bob, to measure Alice’s state ∣iXi jiZð iÞ, the result gotten by
Bob is bit i i ¼ 0; 1ð Þ; otherwise, if basis X Zð Þ is applied to measure ∣iZi (∣iXi) the probability to get i reduces to
1
2. So, if Bob
measures the ∣0Xi state with Z basis, he has the same probability to obtain ∣0Zi or ∣1Zi.
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A variety of attacks have been conceived of as exploiting the security of BB84-based systems,
either theoretically or technologically. The photon number splitting (PNS) attack belongs to the
first category. In the second class, commonly referred to as quantum hacking, the intercept
resend with faked states (IRFS) attack can be included, which exploits loopholes in the ava-
lanche photo diodes (APDs) of the electronic detection system. We will briefly describe each of
them.
1. In the PNS attack the eavesdropper blocks the 1-photon states but she stores the multi-
photon states allowing at least one photon to reach Bob’s detection system. Ideally, in the
BB84 protocol [1], the quantum states sent by Alice to Bob contain single photons. Never-
theless, perfect single photon sources are not technologically available nowadays [21], so,
to get the implementation of QKD, laser pulses attenuated to very low levels have been
used. Such laser pulses contain very short numbers of photons, in average typically
around 0.2 photons per pulse in a Poissonian distribution; that means that most pulses
contain no photons, a few pulses contain just one photon, and a really short amount of
pulse contains two or more photons. If a pulse contains more than one photon, Eve can get
from it the extra photons and transmit a single photon to Bob. Eve can store the photons
she obtained from the multi-photonic pulses and wait until Bob reveals the measurement
basis he has applied. Then Eve can measure the photons she stored by using the same
measurement basis as Bob did. In this way she obtains information about the key without
being noticed by Alice and Bob. This is called the photon number splitting (PNS) attack,
and some related references with security proofs of the PNS attack can be found in [1, 7,
22–24].
To overcome the PNS attack a few protocols have been developed: Decoy QKD [18],
SARG04 [25], the differential phase shift (DPSK) [26], and coherent one way (COW) [27].
One of the most promissory alternatives is the decoy QKD. In this protocol Alice prepares
a set of quantum states in addition to the typical states of the BB84 protocol. These extra
states are called decoy states. Decoy states are used only with the purpose to detect the
eavesdropping activity, rather than establishing the key. In order to produce the decoy
states, Alice randomly uses different mean photon numbers on the photonic source. For
example, she could send the first pulse with a mean photonic pulse of μ ¼ 0:1, the second
pulse with μ ¼ 0:4, the third pulse with μ ¼ 0:05, and so on. To each mean photon number
a different probability of producing more than one photon in the correlated pulse corre-
sponds. The difference between the standards BB84 states and the decoy states is the mean
photon numbers. Given this, Eve is not able to distinguish a decoy state from a quantum
key related state and the only information she gets is the number of photons in a pulse.
Thus, decoy states can be introduced to secure the BB84 protocol from PNS attacks,
allowing at the same time high key rates. In both, BB84 and decoy QKD protocols, a single
photonic gain in the quantum channel is established. Lamentably, Eve can set successful
attacks to the decoy QKD if it is able to set the QBER to zero by adjusting the gain of the
quantum channel.
2. Intercept Resend (IR) attack: In this attack, Eve measures each photon pulse sent by Alice
and replaces it with a different pulse prepared in the quantum state that she has
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previously measured. In 50% of the measurements, Eve successfully chooses the correct
measurement basis, while Bob chooses the same basis as her half of the time. Given that,
she generates a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 50% 50% ¼ 25% (see Figure 2 and a
study by Bennett et al. [7]).
3. Intercept resend with faked states (IRFS) attack.
In the intercept resend with faked states (IRFS) attack, the eavesdropper does not want to
reconstruct the original states. Instead, it produces pulses of light controlled by her that are
detectable by Bob as she stays unnoticed in the quantum channel. Due to imperfections in
their optical system, Alice and Bob assume that the quantum states they are detecting are
the original ones while they are actually detecting light pulses generated by the eaves-
dropper. Those light pulses are known as faked states [10]. There are several weaknesses in
Bob’s detector than can be exploited to perform this attack such as time shift [11–13] or
quantum blinding [10–12]. When using quantum blinding (quantum blinding attack), the
QKD system is controlled by an eavesdropper who uses bright photon pulses during the
linear mode operation of the APDs. Using this attack, Eve can eavesdrop on the full secret
key but it will not increase the QBER of the protocol. To do this, Eve sends bright pulses to
Bob and those are detected by the APD. It will then operate like a classical photo diode
instead of operating in Geiger mode and allowing Eve to obtain the key [14, 15].
Resulting from this, as shown in Figure 3a, when Bob selects the same measurement basis
Eve has chosen, a detection event occurs in the corresponding APD detector. On the other
hand, if Bob measures using the opposite basis, as in Figure 3b, the two detectors get a
part of the optical power and no event is detected. In this way, the eavesdropper blinds
Bob’s APD detectors and makes them work as classical photo diodes. In the final stage of
the protocol, Eve uses the announcements made by Bob on the public channel to execute
the classical post-processing, getting the same secret bit as Alice and Bob.
A watchdog detector that can detect bright faked states can be used as a very simple
countermeasure and it can be applied in the electronic detection system [16]. In the
University of Singapore an intercept resend attack with faked states and quantum blinding
over a commercial QKD system was for the first time implemented [15].
Figure 2. An intercept resend (IR) attack toward the BB84 protocol causes a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 25% that
can be detected. The figure shows Alice sending a ∣0Zi state to Bob. In the middle of the quantum channel is Eve applying
an X basis measurement and she gets ∣1Xi. Consequently, she makes a copy of that state and sends it to Bob who gets ∣1Zi
as he used the Z basis measurement. The process introduces an error in the secret bit given that Alice expects Bob to get
∣0Zi.
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It is important to note that the IRFS attack works dangerously well on widely used QKD
protocols, namely SARG04, BB84, coherent one way (COW), differential phase shift (DPSK),
Ekert [12], and the decoy state method, as described by Wiechers et al. [16] and Sun et al. [28].
The attack shows an extra 3 dB loss due to the basis of mismatch between Eve and Bob. In the
practice, Eve compensates it easily as she can use better detector efficiencies and surpass the
loss in the channel. Demonstrations of blinding attacks on detectors have been implemented in
two commercially available QKD systems [14]. Reports show that Eve obtains the entire secret
key for the time she remains unnoticed by the legitimate parties [15]. We should finally remark
that due to control detector attacks with active basis selection, the gain from Eve to Bob is
reduced by a half compared to the gain from Alice to Bob.
i. For Bob’s basis choice matching Eve’s, the detector clicks deterministically and.
ii. For Bob’s basis choice not matching Eve’s, the faked state is not detected.
3. The ack-state protocol
Consider a BB84-based protocol encoding a classical bit that uses one of the four non-orthogonal
quantum states ∣þXi, ∣Xi, ∣þZi, and ∣Zi (see Figure 1). When using the SARG04 protocol
[25], Alice produces one of the four BB84 quantum states she will send to Bob, it means, she
produces a state associated with two conjugate basis (X and Z). Classical bits on SARG04
Figure 3. In the intercept resend with faked states (IRFS) and quantum blinding attack, Eve and Bob use the same optical
receiver unit so that she can detect Alice’s states in a random basis. Then, Eve prepares the quantum states but sends them
to Bob as bright light pulses instead of quantum pulses. (a) Bob and Eve are using the same basis; (b) the basis Bob is using
is the opposite to ve.
Quantum Flows for Secret Key Distribution
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75964
41
protocol are encoded as follows: 0 is coded with∣þZi and ∣Zi and 1 is coded with ∣þXi and
∣Xi (see Figure 4) where black dots in the bidimensional Bloch sphere represent the qubits
(the non-orthogonal states are right angled and the orthogonal states are represented as diamet-
rically opposed and the parallel states have the same position in the sphere). The basis mea-
surement X and Z appear as horizontal and vertical lines, respectively. In contraposition, the
BB84 protocol encodes the bit 0 as ∣þZi and ∣Xi and the bit 1 with ∣Zi and ∣þXi.
In the sifting phase of the SARG04 protocol, the basis used by Alice is not revealed as this
would reveal the bit. As a substitute, she declares to which sifting set the state belongs in
accordance with the following four sifting sets: S þ;þð Þ ¼ jþXi; jþZif g, S þ;ð Þ ¼ jþXi; jZif g,
S ;þð Þ ¼ jXi; jþZif g, and S ;ð Þ ¼ jXi; jZif g. For instance, consider that Alice sends ∣þXi
and she announces the set S þ;þð Þ. Bob makes his measurements on the X basis and he gets the
Figure 4. The non-orthogonal states used in the SARG04 protocol encodes the bit 0 with the states ∣þZi and ∣Zi and the bit
1 is encoded with ∣þXi and ∣Xi.
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result ∣þXi; and as this result can be obtained for both states in the set S þ;þð Þ; he needs to
dispose of the bit 1 from ∣þXi. In case Bob measures using the Z basis measurement and
obtains ∣þZi, once more, he is not able to distinguish the state sent by Alice. In the opposite
way, if he measures in the Z basis and gets ∣Zi, he is sure Alice sent ∣þXi and adds a 0 to his
key. On her side, Eve needs to perform a measurement using the conjugate basis X and Z to
obtain the same secret bit as Bob, demanding multi-photonic pulses with at least three pho-
tons.
Similar to the BB84, in the ack-state protocol, Alice encodes a classical bit as: 0 is encoded with
∣þZi and ∣Xi and 1 is encoded with ∣Zi and ∣þXi. And also, in the same manner as the
SARG04 protocol, the ack-state uses the four sets of non-orthogonal states S þ;þð Þ ¼ jþXi; jþZif g,
S þ;ð Þ ¼ jþXi; jZif g, S ;þð Þ ¼ jXi; jþZif g, and S ;ð Þ ¼ jXi; jZif g. But in the ack-state pro-
tocol the set Alice used, S þ;þð Þ, S þ;ð Þ, S ;þð Þ or S ;ð Þ, is never revealed. As an illustration,
suppose Alice chooses the set S þ;þð Þ ¼ jþXi; jþZif g rather than transmitting one of the two
states, say ∣þXi, and publishing the sifting instance, S þ;þð Þ, she transmits the two states ∣þXi
and ∣þZi. At that point, Bob measures the states using the same basis, X or Z, one by one, as the
two states reach successively. If Bob measures with the X basis, he surely will obtain ∣þXi (after
he measures the first state) but he can obtain ∣þXi or ∣Xi on the second measurement, with a
probability of 0.5 for each event. If Bob obtains jþXi; jXif g after the second measurement, the
result is unclear to him and he has to discard it. On the other hand, if he gets jþXi; jþXif g the
result is unambiguous and he should add a bit 1 to his key. With the purpose of allowing Alice
to recover the same bit, Bob makes the announcement of the basis measurement X and the
matching condition in accordance with the following criterion: 2Mð Þ if the two detection events
make clicks on the same detector; it includes the cases jþXi; jþXif g, jXi; jXif g, jþZi;f
jþZig, jZi; jZif g and (2nM) if the detection event makes clicks on the opposite detectors,
for example, jþXi; jXif g, jXi; jþXif g, jþZi; jZif g, jZi; jþZif g. Alice obtains the secret bit
given that the jþXi; jþZif g states she sent, the X basis, and the 2Mð Þ measurement result
permit her to conclude that Bob definitely got þX;þXf g (consider the cases depicted in
Table 1).
Contrarily, in the case Bob measured the two states ∣þXi and ∣þZi with the Z basis, he would
acquire one of the two possible results: 2Mð Þ ¼ jþZi; jþZif g or 2nMð Þ ¼ jZi; jþZif g. In the
first case, he publishes the Z basis and the 2Mð Þ result; then Alice and Bob add a 0 to the key. In
the second case, Bob makes the announcement of the Z basis and the 2nMð Þ result but in this
case, they discard the result. When using the ack-state protocol the 2Mð Þ results can be used to
Alice sends Bob obtains a 2Mð Þ Secret bit
jþXi; jþZif g jþXi; jþXif g 1
jþXi; jZif g jþXi; jþXif g 1
jXi; jþZif g jXi; jXif g 0
jXi; jZif g jXi; jXif g 0
Table 1. Using the X basis, Bob measures the two states sent by Alice and he obtains a (2M) result.
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distill secret bits but 2nMð Þ is unclear causing those measurement outcomes to be useless and
so they have to be discarded.
The ack-state protocol was introduced in [4]. In such a reference, the non-orthogonal states are
called protocol states while parallel states are named decoy states. The ack-state protocol encodes
one classical bit using two quantum states. Such encoding is done by means of non-orthogonal
or parallel states. In quantum physics, if X ¼ j0Xf i; j1Xig and Z ¼ j0Zf i; j1Zig are orthonormal
bases, then the magnitude of each basis vector is the unity and any vector in such a space can
be written as a linear combination of such basis. For instance, ∣0Xi can be rewritten as
1
ffiffi
2
p ∣0Zi þ 1ffiffi2p ∣1Zi. Two qubits ∣0Xi and ∣0Zi are non-orthogonal if the inner product between them
is different from zero, symbolically 0X∣0Z 6¼ 0. In consequence, 0X∣0Z ¼ 1ffiffi2p 1ð Þ þ 1ffiffi2p 0ð Þ and
0X∣0Z ¼ 1ffiffi2p . The inner product of orthogonal qubits is zero, for example, 0X∣1X ¼ 0 and identical
(or parallel) qubits produce the unity under the inner product; thus, 0X∣0X ¼ 1.
Using this protocol, Alice chooses at random between sending a pair of parallel or non-
orthogonal states. At the opposite side, Bob makes the measurement of the two successive
pulses he receives with the same basis measurement, X or Z (see Figure 5). In this context, the
pair of quantum states sent by Alice is called biqubit. Parallel biqubits define the parallel
quantum flow and non-orthogonal biqubits define the non-orthogonal quantum flow. Summariz-
ing the ack-state protocol with non-orthogonal and parallel states, we have the following:
1. Alice randomly selects between a non-orthogonal biqubit and a parallel bi-qubit. In case she
selects a non-orthogonal biqubit, she has to select at random one of the following states:
0Xj i; 0Zj ið Þ; 0Xj i; 1Zj ið Þ; 1Xi; 0Zj ij Þ; 1Xj i; 1Zj ið Þð gf , where the order between states X or Z is
as well picked at random. In case she selects a parallel biqubit, she should randomly choose
a biqubit from the set: 0Xj i; 0Xj ið Þ; 1Xj i; 1Xj ið Þ; 0Zi; 0Zj ij Þ; 1Zj i; 1Zj ið Þð gf . and then she gets it
ready and transmits it to Bob.
2. At random, Bob chooses the basis X or Z to measure the received biqubit.
3. Bob’s basis of measurement is announced by him over the public channel and he also
declares if the result obtained is either a double-detected event (2M or 2nM), a single-
detected event (S-1 or S-2), or a lost biqubit 2Lð Þ (see the discussion below).
4. After analyzing those results, Alice tells Bob which cases to discard.
Table 2 shows the results after Bob measures two consecutive states. Thus, one of the follow-
ing detection events can be obtained:
i. The states generate a double-detection event: The symbol þ;þð Þ is used to designate the
photonic gain in a double-detection event. When both events are registered in a same
detector, we call it a double-matching 2Mð Þ detection event. If the results of the measure-
ments of the states are opposite, then we face a double non-matching 2Mð Þ detection
event. Whereas 2Mð Þ non-orthogonal outcomes are useful to distill secret bits, the 2Mð Þ
results cannot be used and are disposed. When we have a 2Mð Þ detection event, we may
say that the second measurement is the acknowledgment (the ack) of the first measure-
ment. In Figure 5 (top-right) the qubit ∣0Xi is the first one sent by Alice and then she sends
Advanced Technologies of Quantum Key Distribution44
the qubit ∣0Zi. As the X basis is used by Bob to measure both qubits, the qubit ∣0Xi is
measured as ∣0Xi but the qubit ∣0Zi is measured as ∣0Xi or ∣1Xi with an equal probability
of 50%. When Bob’s measurement generates ∣0Xi, we say that this measurement is the ack
of the first ∣0Xi state. Vice versa, if Bob gets ∣1Xi, we say that ∣1Xi is the negative
acknowledgment (the nack) of ∣0Xi.
In a channel with losses, we have two more possible results.
ii. The single-detection event occurs when one state is lost and Bob obtains only one detection
event. The symbol ; ∓ð Þ is used to designate the single-detection event. More specifi-
cally, Bob uses the symbol S-ið Þ to represent the single-detection event, where i can be 1 or
Figure 5. In this representation, two concentric circles define the order in which the states are prepared and sent.
Therefore, the state that is first sent is contained in the inner circle state, and the outer circle state is prepared and
transmitted. Alice at random interleaves orthogonal (non-orthogonal) and parallel states, given that she can verify the
matching cases after Bob measurements. In the ack-state protocol, Bob uses the basis X Zð Þ to measure the two Alice’s
non-orthogonal states jiXf i; jjZig. He effectively gets the bit i jð Þ provided he measures jiXf i; jiXig or jjZ
 
; jjZig which
occurs with 12 probability. For instance, if Bob uses the Z basis to measure the incoming states j0Xf i; j1Zig he can obtain
j0Zf i; j1Zig or j1Zf i; j1Zig with the same probability. Alice decides to send at random two consecutive non-orthogonal
states from the set: j0Xð i; j0Zf iÞ; j0Xð i; j1ZiÞ; j0Zð i; j1XiÞ; j1Zð i; j1XiÞg. Bob will measure those states using the same
measurement basis (X or Z). The parallel biqubits involve the following states: j0Xð i; j0Xf iÞ; j1Xð i; j1XiÞ; j0Zð i;
j0ZiÞ; j1Zð i; j1ZiÞg. In the nack-state protocol Alice chooses randomly two consecutive parallel states as the case depicted in
(c) j1Zð i; j1ZiÞ. They produce a compatible measurement if Bob chooses, X for ∣iXi or Z for ∣iZiwhere i ¼ 0, 1. We represent
in (b) the case of quantum orthogonal states. Two cases are possible here: j0Xð i; j1Xf iÞ; j0Zð i; j1ZiÞg.
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2, depending on the state number that makes clicks after the basis measurement X or Z is
applied to the two consecutive incoming states. This way, the number i will be published
by Bob.
iii. The two pulses are lost. This case is denoted as ;ð Þ or alternatively as 2L.
When applying the ack-state protocol, two consecutive non-orthogonal states are used by Alice
and Bob to distill one secret bit. The basis measurement X or Z is declared publicly by Bob
along with the sifting instances; he obtained 2Mð Þ, 2Mð Þ, S-1ð Þ, S-2ð Þ, and 2Lð Þ. Furthermore,
the bits acquired from the single-detection events S-1ð Þ and S-2ð Þ are used by Alice to confirm
the single photonic gain of the quantum channel.
4. The nack-state protocol
The nack-state protocol is the dual version of the ack state protocol discussed in [5]. Both
protocols constitute a generalization of the well-known BB84. The nack state protocol uses
couples of parallel and orthogonal states rather than just single non-orthogonal states utilized as
a part of BB84. This straightforward distinction makes the nack state strong when facing the
IRFS attack, as we will demonstrate later on. We selected the nack prefix to indicate that,
provided Alice transmits two quantum states to Bob, the second measurement behaves as the
negative acknowledgment (nack) of the one before, since it yields the opposite bit result.
The pair of quantum states is denoted as a biqubit. More specifically, the following biqubits are
defined in the nack state protocol: four parallel biqubits j0Xð i; j0XiÞ, j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ, j1Xð i; j1XiÞ,
Alice’s bi-qubit Bob’s side
basis used Detection event Public disclosure Result
∣0Xi, ∣0Zi X ∣0Xi, ∣0Xi X, 2Mð Þ Useful
X ∣0Xi, ∣1Xi X, 2nMð Þ Discard
X ∣0Xi, X, S-1ð Þ Useful
X , ∣0Xi X, S-2ð Þ Discard
X , ∣1Xi X, S-2ð Þ Discard
X , X, 2Lð Þ Discard
Z ∣0Zi, ∣0Zi X, 2Mð Þ Useful
Z ∣1Zi, ∣0Zi X, 2nMð Þ Discard
Z , ∣0Zi Z, S-2ð Þ Useful
Z ∣0Zi, Z, S-1ð Þ Discard
Z ∣1Zi, Z, S-1ð Þ Discard
Z , Z, 2Lð Þ Discard
Table 2. Alice sends to Bob the non-orthogonal states j0Xð i; j0ZiÞ and it shows all the possible measurement results at
Bob’s side.
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j1Zð i; j1ZiÞ and two orthogonal biqubits j0Xð i; j1XiÞ, j0Zð i; j1ZiÞ. The parallel and orthogonal
biqubits are interleaved at random by Alice. The performance of the protocol is not altered by
order of the quantum states within the biqubit (see Figure 5). On the opposite side of the
Alice’s Bob’s Detection Public Description
Biqubit Basis Event Disclosure
X ∣0Xi, ∣1Xi X, 2nM Compatible double non-matching, useful
As two compatible single-detection events
X ∣0Xi, X, S1 Compatible single matching, useful
X , ∣1Xi X, S2 Compatible single matching, useful
X , X, Lost Biqubit lost
Z ∣0Zi, ∣0Zi Z, 2M Non-compatible double matching, useless
Z ∣1Zi, ∣1Zi Z, 2M Non-compatible double matching, useless
∣0Xi, ∣1Xi Z ∣0Zi, ∣1Zi Z, 2M Non-compatible double non-matching, useless
Z ∣1Zi, ∣0Zi Z, 2M Non-compatible double non-matching, useless
Z ∣0Zi, Z, S1 Non-compatible single matching, useless
Z ∣1Zi, Z, S1 Non-compatible single matching, useless
Z , ∣0Zi Z, S2 Non-compatible single matching, useless
Z , ∣1Zi Z, S2 Non-compatible single matching, useless
Z , Z, Lost Biqubit lost
Z ∣1Zi, ∣1Zi Z, 2M Compatible double matching, useful
Z ∣1Zi, Z, S1 Compatible single matching, useful
Z , ∣1Zi Z, S2 Compatible single matching, useful
Z , Z, Lost Biqubit lost
X ∣0Xi, ∣0Xi Z, 2M Non-compatible double matching, useless
X ∣1Xi, ∣1Xi Z, 2M Non-compatible double matching, useless
∣1Zi, ∣1Zi X ∣0Xi, ∣1Xi Z, 2nM Non-compatible double non-matching, useless
X ∣1Xi, ∣0Xi Z, 2nM Non-compatible double non-matching, useless
X ∣0Xi, X, S1 Non-compatible single matching, useless
X ∣1Xi, X, S1 Non-compatible single matching, useless
X , ∣0Xi X, S2 Non-compatible single matching, useless
X , ∣1Xi X, S2 Non-compatible single matching, useless
X , X, Lost Biqubit lost
We expect Alice to send the biqubits ∣0Xi, ∣1Xi and ∣1Zi, ∣1Zi; at that point, every conceivable measurement result at Bob’s
detector is written. We exhibit the detection event and Bob’s corresponding advertisement over the public channel
according to Bob’s basis selection. Notice that the number of the single detections inside the biqubit, first or second, is
openly declared by Bob.
Table 3. The nack-state protocol running without blunders in the quantum channel is shown with each of the possible
measurement results at Bob’s detectors.
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quantum channel, Bob measures two incoming states of a biqubit utilizing the same measure-
ment basis (X or Z). The following steps depict the nack state protocol:
1. Alice is equipped with a photon source with an expected photon number μ showing
Poisson distribution. A parallel or an orthogonal biqubit is selected at random by Alice, and
she arranges the biqubit to be sent to Bob through the quantum channel.
2. The biqubit (two incoming pulses) is measured by Bob using the same measurement basis
X (or Z) that he selects haphazardly (in a further section, we discuss the convenience of
avoiding consecutiveness of states and how it can be prevented if Alice forwards a burst of
the first states of each pair, followed by a burst of the second states of each pair).
3. Bob declares publicly his measurement basis decisions.
4. Alice and Bob perform sifting utilizing single compatible events and double compatible
matching detection events (from parallel states) in order to share secret bits. Likewise,
sifting is applied to the double-detection events that contain a single compatible detection
event. With this aim, Bob indicates if the single detection is the first or the second inside the
biqubit.
Table 3 exhibits a case of the nack state protocol. Here, two biqubits are transmitted to Bob from
Alice. The first biqubit is the orthogonal pair j0Xð i; j1XiÞ, and the second biqubit is the parallel
pair j1Zð i; j1ZiÞ. In case the two states sent by Alice reach Bob’s detection system with no
failure, a double-detection event is generated. In the situation that just one of the two states of
the biqubit reaches Bob’s station, he gets a single-detection event.
The nack-state protocol has been conceived of to use the same optical hardware of the BB84
protocol; thus, it can be configured in most QKD systems as a software module application.
However, two additional tasks must be implemented: the random computation of biqubits
before preparing and sending the quantum states and the sifting stage of the protocol, which
must include (1) sifting of single matching (compatible or non-compatible), where Bob
announces the number of the single-detections inside the biqubit and (2) sifting of double
detection, matching or non-matching, from parallel or orthogonal states. The error correction
and privacy amplification stages of the QKD protocol do not require changes.
5. The photon number splitting attack
In the PNS attack, the eavesdropper captures no less than one photon from each of the multi-
photon states with the purpose of storing them in quantum memory, at the same time that she
hinders the single photon states in the quantum channel. When Bob has uncovered over public
channels the measurement basis he has used, the eavesdropper executes the same measure-
ments on the quantum states she has stored [25].
When the PNS attack is applied to the ack-state protocol, the eavesdropper captures no less
than one photon of the multi-photon states (parallel and non-orthogonal), and she stands by
Bob’s declarations about the measurement bases he has utilized with the aim of applying the
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same measurements on her stored states. In Bob’s side, a distribution over the following sifting
events is achieved 2Mð Þ, 2nMð Þ, S-1ð Þ, S-2ð Þ and 2Lð Þ, where every one may originate in parallel
or non-orthogonal states; however, just Alice knows those outcomes.
After Bob declares both the measurement bases (X or Z) and the sifting occurrences, Eve
executes the measurements utilizing the same measurement bases and she gets the same bits
from the multi-photonic single sifting instances: S-1ð Þ and S-2ð Þ, parallel and non-orthogonal.
Moreover, the same outcomes from the 2Mð Þ measurements of the parallel and (a half of the)
non-orthogonal multi-photonic states are acquired by the eavesdropper. However, she cannot
acquire the secret bits from the 1-state S-ið Þ and 2Mð Þ sifting occurrences, given that the
eavesdropped cannot discriminate parallel and non-orthogonal states.
In order to get the secret bits, Eve obstructs the 1-photon states which incorporate single and
double-detection events from parallel and non-orthogonal states. In doing that, an error gain in
the photonic gain of the single and double-detection events is introduced by Eve. At that point,
Eve executes a channel substitution expanding the transmittance of the channel. The fiber
channel transmittance among Alice and Bob is written as TAB ¼ 10
αl10 where α is the loss
coefficient measured in dB=km and the length l is measured in km. Moreover, the local trans-
mittance at Bob’s side, ηB, is defined as tBηD where tB is the internal transmittance of optical
components and ηD is the quantum efficiency of Bob’s detectors. Then, the general transmis-
sion and detection efficiency at Bob’s side ηBT is computed as ηBT ¼ tBηDTAB [18]. A mathe-
matical description of the gain of detection events will be presented in the following section.
5.1. The gain of detection events
In Table 4 (upper part), the gain of the single-detection events is depicted with the Q þð Þ
symbol. According to Ma et al. [18], the gain of detection events is acquired from two origins:
the photon source and the quantum channel. The photon source presents an expected photon
number μ, and it adopts Poisson distribution. Contrastively, the quantum channel exhibits a
distribution that is computed for every i photons’ state (where i is the quantity of photons in
each pulse) that is named yield. The gain Qi of i photons’ state is the product of the probability
of Alice sending an i photons’ state (that adopts Poisson distribution) and the yield of i
photons’ state (and background states). It will generate a gain at Bob’s side provoked by the
detection of events corresponding to the relation Qi ¼ Yi
μi
i! e
μ where Yi is the yield of i
photons’ state.
The yield Yi is computed across the following steps:
1. The fiber channel transmittance among Alice and Bob is denoted as TAB ¼ 10
αl10 where α is
the loss coefficient measured in dB/km, and the length l is measured in km. Moreover, the
local transmittance at Bob’s side, ηB, is written as tB  ηD where tB is the internal transmit-
tance of optical components and ηD is the quantum efficiency of Bob’s detectors. Then, the
overall transmission and detection efficiency at Bob’s side, ηBT , is computed as
ηBT ¼ tB  ηD  TAB and typically ηBT ranges to 10
3 [18];
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2. The transmittance ηi of i photons’ state at Bob’s, that is, ηBTi ¼ 1 1 ηBT
 i
for i ¼ 0, 1,…,
assuming independence among the i photons of the i photons’ state;
3. The yield Yi of the i photons’ state is acquired from two sources, the background noise Y0ð Þ
and the true signal. Presuming that the background counts are independent from the
signal photon detection, Yi is given by Yi ¼ Y0 þ ηBTi  Y0ηBTi. However, assuming Y0 is
small (around 105) and ηBT  10
3, the above equation can be reduced to Yi  Y0 þ ηBTi.
The overall gain Q þð Þ is the summation of each Qi contribution, thus: Q þð Þ ¼
P
∞
i¼1 Qi ¼
P
∞
i¼1
Yi
μi
i!
eμ, which leads to the relation Y0 þ 1 e
μηBT . Finally, the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
between Alice and Bob has been derived by Ma et al. [18] through the relation
QBERAB ¼
0:5Y0þed 1e
μηBTð Þ
Y0þ1eμηBT
, where ed is the error probability of the detector ed  10
2
 
.
With the aim to obtain the gain of double-detection events Q ;ð Þ, Q ;∓ð Þ, and Q þ;þð Þ, we
consider that each gain has independence of any other, that is, Q ;ð Þ ¼ Q ð Þ Q ð Þ,
Q þ;ð Þ ¼ Q þð Þ Q ð Þ, Q þ;ð Þ  Q ;þð Þ, and Q þ;þð Þ ¼ Q þð Þ Q þð Þ. From the previous discussion,
we know that the gain of the double-detection events decreases quadratically:Q þ;þð Þ  Q
2
þð Þ. In
practical implementations of QKD, the single-matching events have the order of 105, while
the double-matching events reach the order of 1010.
5.2. Detecting the photon number splitting attack
In replacing TAB, the photonic gain of the single-detection events or the double-detection
events can be adjusted by Eve but not both at the same time. In contrast, Alice utilizes the
Photonic-Gain Alice Alice  Bob Eve  Bob
Q ð Þ e
μ eμηBT  Y0 —
Q þð Þ 1 e
μ Y0 þ 1 e
μηBT 1
2 Y0 þ 1 e
μηETð Þ
Q ;ð Þ e
2μ
eμηBT  Y0ð Þ
2 —
Q ;∓ð Þ 2e
μ 2 eμηBT  Y0ð Þ e
μηET  Y0ð Þ
1 eμð Þ Y0 þ 1 e
μηBTð Þ Y0 þ 1 e
μηETð Þ
Q þ;þð Þ 1 eμð Þ
2
Y0 þ 1 e
μηBTð Þ2 12 Y0 þ 1 e
μηETð Þ2
Here, ηBT and ηET are the overall efficiency of Bob and Eve, respectively. In the IRFS attack, Eve remains undetected given
that she meets the condition ηET ≥
ln 2eμηBT Y01ð Þ
μ . At the lower part of the table, the gain of the double þ;þð Þ-detection
events is shown, which is denoted as Q þ;þð Þ, and the gain of single ; ∓ð Þ detection events is represented as Q ;∓ð Þ. In the
IRFS attack, Eve can effectively forward half of her biqubits to Bob’s detectors. The “” symbol denotes multiplication
inside the Q ;∓ð Þ relation. The factor of 1/2 is a result of Bob using an active basis choice, compelling Eve to blind his
detector when his basis differs from her own (half the time), and considering that each pair of pulses is detected in the
same basis, Bob will always be blinded by Eve for both pulses or neither pulses, resulting in the same factor 1/2 for both
single and double-detection events
Table 4. The background noise is defined as the gain of the single (non-empty) and empty pulses, Q þð Þ and Q ð Þ,
respectively, where μ is the expected photon number of the source and Y0.
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double-matching detection events 2Mð Þ and the S-ið Þ sifting instances which are consistent
with the states she fixed, to verify corresponding photonic gains, parallel and non-orthogonal.
As mentioned before, the one-photon states are blocked by eavesdropper and she performs a
channel substitution to adjust the transmittance of the channel, TAB. Nevertheless, this activity
produces error gains in the single- and double-detection events that Alice can verify.
The QPEG after Eve blocks the one-photon states and can be written as ΔQ ¼ Q1 where Q1 is
the gain of the one-photon states and it must be computed for the single- and the double-
detection events. The error gain is ΔQ þ;þð Þ ¼ Q
2
1 þð Þ
¼ Q21 and ΔQ ;∓ð Þ ¼ Q1 Q ð Þ for double-
detection events and single-detection events, respectively, where Q1 þð Þ ¼ Y0 þ η Y0ηð Þμe
μ,
Q ð Þ ¼ e
μη  Y0, η is the transmittance of the channel, and the detectors at Bob’s side of the
one-photon states and Y0 is the background noise according to Ma et al. [18].
The eavesdropper must adjust the transmittance, TAB, in order to remain hidden in the channel
to achieve the two reference photonic gains, Q þ;þð Þ and Q ;∓ð Þ, for the double-detection events
and single-detection events, respectively. Given Q þ;þð Þ 6¼ Q ;∓ð Þ Eve can adjust TAB to Q
2
1 or
Q1 Q ð Þ but not both simultaneously. In other words, she is not able to fulfill the conditions
ΔQ þ;þð Þ ¼ 0 and ΔQ ;∓ð Þ ¼ 0; in this manner, the attack becomes detectable. If the eavesdrop-
per adjusts TAB to make it produce a photonic deviation in one or in both gains, she will
introduce a detectable QBER to the system.
Consequently, Eve knows that she must be careful and makes no changes in TAB; otherwise,
she will be detected. Now, the QBER that Eve produces is 0:5Q0þ0:5
2Q1þ0:5
3Q2þ…
Q0þQ1þQ2þ…
because the
QBER of single-detection events is 0:52 as in BB84. In contrast, when no attack is produced
the QBER of the system is given by 0:5Q0þed Q1þQ2þQ3þ…ð ÞQ0þQ1þQ2þ…
where ed is the detection error
according to Ma et al. [18].
Given that the probability of obtaining a (compatible) matching measurement from the non-
orthogonal double-detection events is 0:52, we derived the error rate of the non-orthogonal
double-detection events as 0:5 Q0þQ1ð Þþ0:5
2Q2þ0:5
3Q3þ…
Q0þQ1þQ2þ…
. The QBER from the multi-photonic non-
orthogonal states decreases one-half for each copy of quantum states in Eve’s memory. In
contrast, no contribution is made by the multi-photonic parallel states to increase the QBER
because Bob makes public the basis measurements used by him.
6. The IRFS attack
What should Alice and Bob expect from the nonappearance of the IRFS attack? For illustrative
purposes, consider the situation where μ ¼ 0:2, ηBT ¼ 0:8, which is the general efficiency
among Alice and Bob and zero dark counts Y0 ¼ 0ð Þ. In such a case, the great majority of the
total biqubits sent by Alice to Bob ends up in Bob’s station as lost biqubits  72:61%ð Þ; single-
detection events are  25:2%, and just  0:0219% of the measurement cases are double-
detection events. Despite the double-detection gain being very low, it ought not be viewed as
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insignificant given that the amount of pulses sent by Alice is high (1011  1013 [29]), and the
transmission interim can be legitimately upgraded. However, for practical purposes, we will
presume that the secret bits in the nack state protocol are delivered by single-detection events,
and the key rate is at most the BB84 key rate. Nevertheless, we assert that double-detection
events can be utilized to identify the IRFS attack, so in this section, we defend the security of
the protocol, in spite of Eve’s endeavors to enhance her attack.
6.1. Detecting the IRFS attack with blinding pulses and quantum channel substitution
Within the sight of the IRFS attack with blinding pulses, Eve is amid the quantum channel
utilizing an optical detection system comparable to Bob’s station. Eve is challenged to repro-
duce gains of single- and double-detection events at Bob’s side to pass unnoticed in the
quantum channel. However, the gain of the single-detection events decreases directly with
the channel efficiency, but the double-detection gain drops quadratically. In the next section we
demonstrate that, for practical parameters of the quantum channel, the two gains cannot be
adjusted by the eavesdropper at the same time. Eve cannot control the two gains because of the
fact that:
1. the transmittance of the channel can be adjusted to a unique value by the eavesdropper
either to adjust the single or the double-detection gain and
2. Eve’s station receives Alice’s optical pulses sequentially. In this manner, once a pulse is
detected in the eavesdropper station, she is not able to knowwhether the next pulse will be
likewise detected or lost. That is, Eve has no form to know when a single or a double-
detection event will occur.
Eve still has the possibility to adjust the efficiency of the quantum channel to the gain of the
double-detection events. Therefore, with the purpose of removing the excess of the single-
detection gain, Eve could eliminate pulses in proportion to some probability (e.g., 0.5). How-
ever, in accordance with the second statement given previously in this section, the eavesdrop-
per would lose double-detection pulses (a quarter in this example). Eve could be more selective
discarding only single-detection events on which the detection occurred in the second pulse.
By using this scheme, the double-detection gain is unaltered for Eve. However, given that the
number of single detections inside the biqubit, first or second (see Table 3), is announced by
Bob publicly, the presence of Eve becomes evident.
Both strategies could be combined by Eve to increase the efficiency of the channel to produce an
overabundance of the double-detection gain, but it would also increase the single-detection gain.
The issue for Eve is that once a strategy to remove pulses is chosen, it affects equally the single-
and the double-detection gains. Such gains obey diverse rates: while the first decreases linearly, the
second fluctuates quadratically with the transmittance of the channel. Moreover, at the receiver
station, the single- and double-detection events are registered as haphazard interleaved events.
In the following sections, a convenient method to compute the photon gain deviation caused
by the IRFS attack at a practical level is discussed.
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6.2. Detecting the IRFS attack with quantum channel substitution
It is expected that the eavesdropper would endeavor to adjust both gains, from single- and
double-detection events, applying a quantum channel substitution and tuning it to a specific
transmittance. We define the quantum photon error gain (QPEG or simply ΔQ) as the devia-
tion from the reference gain that is caused by Eve’s apparatus at Bob’s receiver station when
she performs the IRFS attack. In ordinary conditions, it is ideally expected that ΔQ  0, for the
single- and the double-detection events.
QPEG of double þ;þð Þ-detection events is written as ΔQ þ;þð Þ, while we denote the QPEG of
single ; ∓ð Þ-detection events as ΔQ ;∓ð Þ. ΔQ þ;þð Þ is computed as the difference Q þ;þð ÞAB
Q þ;þð ÞEB where the symbol þ;þð ÞAB defines the reference gain of the double-detection events
and þ;þð ÞEB denotes the gain of the double-detection events at Bob’s side but in the presence
of Eve. Similarly, ΔQ ;∓ð Þ is computed as Q ;∓ð ÞAB Q ;∓ð ÞEB , where we apply the sub-index of
; ∓ð ÞAB and ; ∓ð ÞEB with the same intention.
Using the relations of Table 4, the possibility of the eavesdropper to fulfill simultaneously the
conditions ΔQ þ;þð Þ ¼ 0 and ΔQ ;∓ð Þ ¼ 0 can be established. Allow Eve to adjust freely ηBT and
ηET . Thus, the eavesdropper’s goal is to make ΔQ þ;þð ÞAB ¼ ΔQ þ;þð ÞEB and ΔQ ;∓ð ÞAB ¼
ΔQ ;∓ð ÞEB . The following equation system is obtained:
2 eμηBT  Y0ð Þ Y0 þ 1 eμηBTð Þ ¼ eμηET  Y0ð Þ Y0 þ 1 eμηETð Þ (1)
Y0 þ 1 eμηBTð Þ2 ¼ 1
2
Y0 þ 1 eμηETð Þ2 (2)
Solving the system for ηET, we get
lnY0
μ and
ln 1þY0ð Þ
μ , which, in the practice, cannot be satisfied,
given that the second relation yields ηET as negative and the first relation cannot be fulfilled for
typical parameters, for example, Y0 ¼ 105, μ ¼ 0:1 produces ηET ¼ 1:15. Consider also the
cases depicted in Figure 6.
6.3. The photon and the vacuum ratios
We will introduce a convenient method to detect the presence of the eavesdropper without
requiring one to compute deviations from the reference gain, that is, ΔQ þ;þð Þ ¼ 0 or
ΔQ ; ∓ð Þ ¼ 0. For this purpose, let us define the photon ratio R as the relation between the
gains QEB
QAB
where the subscript EB denotes the presence of the eavesdropper and AB indicates its
absence. For double-detection events, we represent R as
Q þ;þð ÞEB
Q þ;þð ÞAB, while
Q ;∓ð ÞEB
Q ;∓ð ÞAB for single-
detection events. In addition, we will define the vacuum ratio r as e
μηETY0
eμηBTY0.If the eavesdropper
adjusts the channel to achieve Q þ;þð ÞAB ¼ Q þ;þð ÞEB, then Eq. (2) is satisfied. We get that
R ;∓ð Þ ¼ rffiffi2p , but r ¼
eμηETY0
eμηBTY0 and ηET ≥ ηBT ; thus, r ≤ 1 and R ;∓ð Þ ≤
1
ffiffi
2
p . To discard Eve’s pres-
ence, it is not necessary to verify that ΔQ ; ∓ð Þ ¼ 0, but it must be confirmed that R ;∓ð Þ > 1ffiffi2p .
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Contrarily, if Eve modifies the channel to achieve Q ; ∓ð ÞAB ¼ Q ; ∓ð ÞEB, we get that
R þ;þð Þ ¼
2
r2. Since r ≤ 1, we obtain that the IRFS attack causes R þ;þð Þ ≥ 2. To make sure that the
system is protected against the IRFS attack, it is not necessary to check ΔQ þ;þð Þ ¼ 0 but it is
enough verifying its equivalent R þ;þð Þ < 2.
6.4. The QBER of one-photon states
As quoted previously, in the nack state protocol, the great majority of the pulses sent by Alice to
Bob behave as BB84 signal pulses. Each time a compatible basis measurement is applied by
Bob, the result, either from single detection or double detection, is useful as in BB84. Thus, for
practical purposes, the nack state protocol has an efficiency comparable to the BB84. However, a
partial reduction of the bit rate can be expected, as Alice reduces the optical pulse rate to avoid
the eavesdropper to record double-detection events. In this way, Eve is detected if she stays
waiting for double-detection events before she can forward them.
Given that it decreases quadratically, the rate of the double-detection event is small. Neverthe-
less, at the same time, it is extraordinary that the QBER of the double-matching detection
events from parallel and orthogonal states also decreases quadratically. To see this, let us recall
Figure 6. The deviation from the reference gain is shown on the y-axis. The upper and bottom left graphs represent
double detections, while the right graphs correspond to single detections. Considering that ηBT ¼ 0:001 and Eve uses
ηET ¼ 0:0014, she accomplishes in (a), ΔQ þ;þð Þ ¼ 0, however, in (b), ΔQ ;∓ð Þ 6¼ 0. Conversely, if Eve adjusts ηET ¼ 0:002,
she gets in (d)) ΔQ ;∓ð Þ ¼ 0, but in (c), she provokes simultaneously that ΔQ þ;þð Þ 6¼ 0.
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that in the BB84 protocol, the probability to get the correct bit is pc ¼ 1þ Vð Þ=2, and the
probability to obtain an erroneous bit is pe ¼ 1 Vð Þ=2, where V is the visibility of the optical
system. To calculate the QBER of the one-photon states, the relation QBER ¼ pe= peþ pcð Þ is
applied [31].
Now, suppose that the two parallel states are sent by Alice j1Zð i; j1ZiÞ to Bob who measures
them using the Z basis. Those states are depicted in Figure 7a. The probability to get the two
states j1Zð i; j1ZiÞ is p
2
c , and the probability to get the opposite values j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ is p
2
e , case II of
Figure 7a. Since the measurement cases j0Zð i; j1ZiÞ and j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ, Cases III and IV of
Figure 7a, are always disposed because they are non-matching cases, the final probabilities
are pcparallel ¼
p2c
p2cþp
2
e
and peparallel ¼
p2e
p2cþp
2
e
. The same reasoning can be applied to the orthogonal
biqubits case as depicted in Figure 7b.
Those relations forward us to the QBER of the parallel and orthogonal states QBER ¼ 1Vð Þ
2
1Vð Þ2þ 1þVð Þ2
.
Figure 8 gives an illustration of the QBER of one-photon states of such protocols. Considering
the QBER of the nack state is lower than BB84, it is interesting to acknowledge that the double-
Figure 7. The QBER of parallel and orthogonal states: Cases III and IV of (a) and (b) can be discarded by Alice, so they do
not produce errors.
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detection gain could be increased by future technologies. Even though there is not yet a formal
derivation of the secret key rate for double-detection events, we can expect that the small QBER
would lead to reaching longer QKD distances.
6.5. The non-structured nack-state protocol
In the argument of Point 2 of Section 6.1, it is implicit that Eve uses only a single station, but
this is not a practical restriction. Eve could use two stations, one near to Alice to detect and one
near to Bob to generate fake pulses. In the event that quantum channel utilizes optical fibers
(the most widely recognized useful channel for ground-based QKD), everything required by
Eve is a radio connection between her two stations to “catch up” with the quantum link. Even
assuming a low source rate of 1 MHz, the time delay between pulses is only 1 microsecond,
which can be easily compensated using a 600 m link (traveling in free space takes 2 microsec-
onds; traveling in fiber takes 3 microseconds). Any practical QKD system will operate over
distances greater than 600 m, making it entirely achievable for Eve to detect both pulses of a
pair before transmitting her fake state to Bob using a second station.
A 100 km link in optical fiber would limit the source rate to 6 kHz, and much less if the fiber is
not straight, which is almost always the case. To truly be secure the period between two pulses
would have to be the full travel time of the pulse over the quantum channel. For 100 km, it
Figure 8. The nack state protocol uses pairs of parallel and orthogonal states. The QBER of parallel and orthogonal states is
derived using the probabilities of two consecutive BB84 measurements.
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would be 500 microseconds, forcing a source rate of 2 kHz. Given the conservative fiber link
loss of 0.2 dB/km the detection rate after 100 km (20 dB) would be less than 20/s, not counting
detection efficiency. Shorter distances would be more favorable, but this implies the protocol is
limited to short distances. There also is not any point in randomly adding delays as Eve would
still be able to perfectly replicate the gains when the delay is insufficient and could choose to
simply not intercept when the delay is too long, giving her partial information without any
hint of her presence.
Unfortunately for Eve, Alice can apply a reduction in the optical pulse rate forcing Eve to
introduce a delay in the arrival time of the pulses at Bob’s station. As a matter of fact, Alice
could adjust such delay sending slow pulses as a random burst. Furthermore, slowing pulses
can enhance the double-detection rate at Bob’s side by reducing after-pulsing errors.
However, there is no reason why each pair must be sent in sequence. We call this protocol the
non-structured nack-state. If Alice were to transmit a burst of the first states of each pair,
followed by a burst of the second states of each pair, she would create a separation between
the pairs equal to the length of the bursts and she would not reduce the pulse rate. Consider a
100 km fiber optic link; it would be able to send the first states of each pair for 500 microsec-
onds, followed by the second state of each pair for the next 500 microseconds, with Bob
rechoosing the same basis for both 500 microsecond bursts. Since the 500 microsecond delay
is at least the full travel time in the quantum channel, Eve would always be compelled to fake
the first state of each pair before receiving the second. If there is no issue with this approach,
the authors can use it to justify Point 2 of Section 6.1, which in turn justifies Point 1 of the same
section.
6.6. Faking double-detection events
Another possibility for the eavesdropper is to fake double-detection events. After all, we may
inquire why Eve cannot fake double-detection events as she stays covered up in the channel.
First of all, let us recall that Alice knows which biqubits contain parallel or orthogonal states.
Second, consider the cases portrayed in Table 5. Assume the j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ biqubit has been sent
to Bob by Alice. The first pulse reaches Eve’s station, who measures it with the X (or Z) basis,
but the second pulse arrives as a vacuum state either by the effect of the quantum channel, the
detection system, or the photon source. Thus, Eve gets a single-detection event. In this
moment, Eve determines to fake the second state, but she realizes that there are six potential
outcomes to fake the j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ biqubit; such cases are listed in Table 5. Additionally, one of
those cases is erroneous because no orthogonalmeasurement can be derived from parallel states.
In this example, j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ cannot be obtained from j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ. Likewise, j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ cannot be
derived from j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ. Consequently, if Eve tries to fake a double-detection event, she will
produce a bit error of 16. In this situation, a bit error is produced when Alice expects a double
non-matching event but Bob announces a double-matching event or vice versa.
According to Collins et al. [30], Bob’s visibility of Alice’s quantum state is computed as
VAB ¼
P signalð Þ
P totalð Þ where P signalð Þ ¼ TAB  η Vopt and P totalð Þ ¼ TAB  ηþ 1 TAB  ηð Þ
2 Y0. Here, Vopt is the optical visibility with a perfect source and detectors; η is the probability
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Alice’s Biqubit Eve’s Basis Eve’s Detection Forwarded States Eve’s Result
j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ Z ; j0Zð iÞ j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ Hidden
j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ Detected
X ; j0Xð iÞ j0Xð i; j0XiÞ Hidden
j1Xð i; j0XiÞ Hidden
; j1Xð iÞ j0Xð i; j1XiÞ Hidden
j1Xð i; j1XiÞ Hidden
j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ Z ; j0Zð iÞ j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ Detected
j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ Hidden
X ; j0Xð iÞ j0Xð i; j0XiÞ Hidden
j1Xð i; j0XiÞ Hidden
; j1Xð iÞ j0Xð i; j1XiÞ Hidden
j1Xð i; j1XiÞ Hidden
However, she can use six possible states, but one of them is erroneous, so she introduces an error probability of 16. Here,
the six choices for j0Zð i; j0ZiÞ and j1Zð i; j0ZiÞ biqubits are shown
Table 5. As soon as Eve detects the first state of a biqubit, she tries to fake the second state.
Figure 9. The error rate of double-detection events caused by the IRFS attack is 16. When it is compared to the QBER of the
quantum channel, the maximum secure distance to detect the IRFS attack is 176 km. In the presence of the IRFS attack,
perfect visibility and zero dark counts are assumed in the link between Alice and Eve and from her to Bob.
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of detecting the photon when it arrives; TAB is the transmittance between Alice and Bob; and Y0
is the background noise. On practical experimental parameters: α ¼ 0:25 dB km1, η ¼ 0:3,
Y0 ¼ 10
4, and Vopt ¼ 0:99. Figure 9 shows the visibility as a function of the distance.
On the other hand, the QBER in BB84 can be computed as QBER ¼ pepeþpc, where pc (pe) is the
probability to get, correctly or erroneously, the quantum bit sent by Alice, respectively. If we
write such probabilities as a function of the optical visibility V, we have pc ¼ 1þ Vð Þ=2 and
pe ¼ 1 Vð Þ=2.
Therefore, pc ¼
p2c
p2cþp
2
e
and pe ¼
p2e
p2cþp
2
e
, and we derived the QBER of the parallel and orthogonal
states as QBER ¼ 1Vð Þ
2
1Vð Þ2þ 1þVð Þ2
.
IfQBER of double-detection events produced by the quantum channel is compared against the
1
6 error rate caused by the eavesdropper, we can find that the maximum secure distance for
detecting the IRFS attack when the eavesdropper fakes double-detection events is 176 km,
which is within the range of the BB84 key rate, as it appears in Figure 9.
7. Conclusions
In the quantum flows approach, the transmitter interleaves pairs of quantum states, parallel
and orthogonal (non-orthogonal), while the receiver applies active basis selection to perform state
measurement. The QKD protocols based on quantum flows uses the same optical hardware of
the BB84 protocol, and they can be implemented in most QKD systems as a software module
application.
The ack-QKD protocol can be useful to detect the PNS attack. If the eavesdropper adjusts the
transmittance TAB of the channel it produces a deviation in one or in both photonic gains; thus,
she will introduce a detectable QBER to the system.
On the other side the intercept resend with faked (blinding) states (IRFS) attack is detected by
the nack-state protocol using the gain of single- and double-detection events where theQBER of
double-detection events of the quantum channel is compared against the 16 error rate caused by
the eavesdropper, so the maximum secure distance results in 176 km.
Although double-detection events represent a small fraction of the total detection events, they
are useful to detect the IRFS attack. In addition, the smaller QBER can be useful in future
implementations to distill secret bits at longer distances.
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